What Role for Property Taxes in Ireland?. ESRI WP322. October 2009 by Callan, T. et al.
  
 
 
 
www.esri.ie 
 
 
Working Paper No. 322 
 
October 2009 
 
What Role for Property Taxes in Ireland? 
T. Callan, C. Keane and J.R. Walsh 
 
 
 
 
Subsequently published in "What Role for Property Taxes in Ireland?" 
 The Economic and Social Review, Vol. 41, No 1, Spring 2010, pp.87-
107 
 
 
 
 
 
Corresponding Author: Tim.Callan@esri.ie 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ESRI working papers represent un-refereed work-in-progress by members who are solely 
responsible for the content and any views expressed therein. Any comments on these papers 
will be welcome and should be sent to the author(s) by email. Papers may be downloaded for 
personal use only. 
 
-2- 
What Role for Property Taxes in Ireland? 
 
1. Introduction 
What role could a property tax play in broadening the Irish tax base? Could a 
recurrent tax on immovable property provide greater stability than a system of stamp 
duties, while removing obstacles to mobility? What about the relationship between a 
property tax and ability to pay – should or could the bills facing those with valuable 
houses and little income be reduced or eliminated without making a property tax a 
quasi-income tax? These are among the questions explored in this paper, which 
provides a broad picture of the issues, illustrated by detailed microsimulation of the 
impact of specific forms of property tax.  
 
Our analysis builds on the ESRI tax benefit model, SWITCH,1, which works with 
data from the Central Statistics Office’s Survey on Income and Living Conditions 
(EU-SILC) for 2005. The data drawn from the survey include information on house 
values, as assessed by the owner-occupiers. Cross-checks indicate that such 
information tends to be of good quality. (Callan, 1991). Of course, in implementing a 
property tax, the issue of achieving reliable valuations on which to base tax 
assessments is rather different. Approaches taken elsewhere to this valuation problem 
are reviewed at a later stage. But we focus initially on issues regarding the design of a 
tax, in the case where information on individual capital values for each house are 
available (as is the case in Northern Ireland). The Commission’s report proposes that 
a property tax be introduced with tax liability depending on banded house values; the 
broad impact would be similar, but differences between the exact value and banded 
approaches would merit further study. 
 
The appropriate design for a property tax depends in large measure on the rationale 
for property taxation: the “how” of property tax depends on the “why”. In Section 2 
we review the rationale for property taxation, along with previous Irish experience 
with property taxes, and some insights from international experience. Section 3 then 
                                                 
1 The acronym stands for Simulating Welfare and Income Tax CHanges. 
-3- 
deals with a series of issues about the design of a property tax for Ireland, providing a 
base for later development and analysis of policy options. Section 4 describes the data 
used in the paper, including data on self-assessed house values from owner-occupiers 
in the CSO’s Survey on Income and Living Conditions. Section 5 provides results on 
the revenue and distributional impact of a property tax, using the SWITCH model, 
and flags issues regarding the implications for financial incentives to work. The main 
findings of the paper, along with pointers towards research issues for the future, are 
drawn together in the final section.  
2. Rationale for property taxation 
Heady (2009) listed a number of features of property taxes which make them a useful 
part of the overall tax base, and a feature of tax systems in most industrialised 
countries: 
 
• property is immobile 
• property taxes are hard to evade or avoid 
• property is suitable as a local tax base 
• property tax revenue can be used to reduce the burden of income taxation, and 
has fewer behavioural consequences than income taxes 
• property taxes can offset distortions caused by favourable tax treatments of 
owner occupation which tend to cause overinvestment in housing 
• property is a major component of wealth 
 
All of these are relevant to the Irish situation. However, we will not attempt to deal 
with the issue of local taxation in this paper. We examine the potential for a national 
property tax. It may be desirable for this part of the tax base to come under local 
control, but this issue is left aside for the present. 
 
OECD (2006) has stated that “Ireland has some of the most generous tax provisions 
for owner-occupied housing, largely because it is the only OECD country that allows 
a tax deduction for mortgage interest payments at the same time as not taxing property 
values, capital gains or imputed rent”. 
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In this context, we would argue (along the lines set out in Callan, 1991) that the best 
direction is a property tax on property values approximating a tax on imputed rent, 
while retaining some element of mortgage interest relief. This is because the tax is 
principally aimed at deriving revenue from owner-occupation, which as OECD states, 
has a tax-favoured status. It may be appropriate to have some form of property tax for 
the rental sector, but it should not be assumed that this would have exactly the same 
form – or the same goals – as a property tax on the owner occupied sector.  
2.1 Tax treatment of property in Ireland 
A comprehensive overview of the fiscal treatment of property in Ireland has recently 
been provided by Ryan (2009).Here, instead, we focus on selected aspects of Irish 
experience with property related taxes. 
 
Domestic rates were abolished in 1978. Rates were a highly unpopular tax, and it is 
worth considering what aspects of rates generated that unpopularity. Rates were a 
highly salient tax, payable in two lump sums (or moieties) each year. This contrasts 
with tax paid under PAYE, where the taxpayer is not required to make a specific 
payment. Rates were widely regarded as unfair. Properties had not been revalued for 
many years, so that discrepancies arose in relative valuations (e.g., as between older 
and new property). 
 
The Residential Property Tax had both a property value exemption limit and an 
income exemption limit. These combined to result in tax which applied only to a 
small proportion of the population, and generated very limited revenue. Experience 
with this tax is of quite limited value when considering a much broader property tax. 
With a tax applicable only to about 5 per cent of households, a key priority must be 
identifying the relevant houses and owners. With a more general tax, the issues are 
rather different. A further consideration is that up to three-quarters of the revenue was 
raised from Dublin. However, this is not a necessary feature of a property tax, as will 
be seen in Section 5.  
2.2 International experience 
Table 1 below shows how property tax revenue as a share of total tax revenue has 
changed in Ireland between 1986 and 2006. In 1986, revenue from property taxes was 
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less than 4 per cent of total tax revenue. This was somewhat less than the EU and 
OECD averages, and substantially less than the share of 8 to 12 per cent found in 
Australia, Canada, the UK and the US. By 2006, revenue from property taxes in 
Ireland had risen to about 9 per cent of total revenue - putting Ireland into the group 
of countries in which property taxes had the most important role, supplying around 10 
per cent of total revenue. 
 
Table 1: Property Tax as a proportion of Total Tax Revenue 
Country 1986 1996 2006 
EU15 4.2 5.7 5.6 
OECD 4.5 5.1 4.8 
Australia 8.1 9.0 9.1 
Canada 9.4 10.5 10.1 
IRELAND 3.8 4.7 9.1 
UK 12.4 10.3 12.4 
US 10.9 10.9 11.1 
 
Of course, this pattern largely reflects the fact that in Ireland, stamp duties on house 
purchases provide the main source of property tax revenues. Revenue from such taxes 
rose sharply during the prolonged housing boom. Revenue from this source has 
declined sharply to much lower levels, as the number of transactions has fallen. 
Amounts payable in stamp duty were also reduced by the measures in Budget 2008 
which reshaped the system from one with higher percentage taxes on the entire value 
above successive thresholds into a graduated tax. 
 
A recurrent tax on residential property has two major advantages over a transactions 
based tax like stamp duty. First, a stamp duty provides a barrier to mobility, 
encouraging owner occupiers to stay in the same home. This works against efficient 
use of the housing stock, and is a barrier to mobility in the labour market. Second, as 
is evident in the Irish case, stamp duties are strongly influenced by the housing cycle, 
with larger revenues during a boom, and much smaller revenues during a downturn as 
at present. A recurrent tax on residential property helps to provide a more stable 
source of revenue. 
 
While UK experience is often of value in exploring tax options for Ireland, the nature 
of the Council Tax, which had its origins in the Community Charge (commonly 
known as the poll tax) makes it of less value on this occasion. However, recent 
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Northern Ireland experience in moving from a system of domestic rates based on 
rental values to a system based on capital values is highly relevant. (Northern Ireland 
Department of Finance and Personnel, 2002, 2004, 2007, 2009) 
3. Issues in the design of a property tax for Ireland 
There are a number of key choices to be made in designing a recurrent tax on 
residential property. In this section we consider some of the main elements, and 
outline the choices made in the design of a property tax to be modelled in the Irish 
setting in the next section. 
3.1 Tax Base 
One key element is the base on which the tax is to be levied. Is it to be on; 
• All property 
• All residential property 
• All owner occupied residential property 
Given that rates already apply to commercial and industrial property, we take it that 
the property tax of interest in the Irish case is a tax on residential property. But should 
the tax apply only to owner-occupied residential property, or to all residential 
property, including the rented sector? In our view, as set out in Section 2, there is a 
strong argument for a property tax on owner-occupied property, proxying a tax on the 
imputed income from owner occupation. This helps to offset the very favourable tax 
treatment of owner occupied property in Ireland identified by OECD (2006) among 
others.  
 
There may also be a role for a property tax on the rental sector, but here the rationale 
is rather different. While the imputed income from owner occupation is not 
monetized, and not taxed, there is income generated by the rental sector which is 
subject to tax. On the other hand, there have also been generous tax incentives for the 
rental sector, some of which are currently being phased out. A property tax in the 
rental sector might be designed to ensure a “back stop” so that tax breaks do not play 
such a large role in offsetting rental income for tax purposes. Property tax might be 
treated as an advance payment against income tax, for example. 
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3.2 Valuation 
How should the relative tax burden borne by different properties be determined? Two 
main approaches are used, one focusing on capital market values and the other on 
rental values. In an environment where rates of owner occupation are close to 80 per 
cent, capital market values have a natural advantage in being more clearly visible and 
established for owner-occupied property. 
 
How should properties be valued? Given that property taxes are common around the 
world, this issue has been faced in many different environments. Close to home, there 
is the  recent example of the Rating Review process in Northern Ireland. (Northern 
Ireland Department of Finance and Personnel, 2002, 2004). Computer assisted mass 
appraisal combined the skills of valuers with regression models of house prices to 
allow for a revaluation of the housing stock within about 2 years. (See McCluskey et 
al, 1997 and McCluskey et al., 2007). The broad approach of the regression models is 
to relate the observed price of a house to its characteristics (location, size, number of 
bedrooms etc.). Once this relationship is established, it is possible to predict with 
reasonable accuracy the value of a house once a small number of key characteristics 
are known. The process need not be purely mechanical: it is possible for valuers to 
make an adjustment to the initial estimate. Furthermore, the owner can appeal a 
valuation. 
 
In Northern Ireland, about 700,000 properties had to be valued. Appeals were 
expected from around 100,000, but in fact only about 40,000 households appealed 
their valuation. About half of these were readily dealt with by a helpline which sorted 
out discrepancies over the information used in the assessment or clerical errors. Most 
of the remainder were dealt with either by an appeal to the District Valuer or to the 
Commissioner of Valuation. Only a small number were referred upwards to an 
Independent Valuation Tribunal. One factor which may have led to the low level of 
appeals was that rising house prices meant that owners were typically comparing the 
current house price with a valuation for a date somewhat earlier. 
 
Can self-assessment play a role in valuing houses? Certainly it would seem possible 
to request basic information on a property from the owner, with systems of audit and 
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penalty that make honesty the best policy. Direct self-assessment of the value by the 
owner may, in some circumstances, also be practicable. But in current circumstances, 
there is great uncertainty about market values – with few transactions to guide owners 
in assessing their home values. 
 
How often should revaluations be carried out? The international experience suggests 
that revaluations should be undertaken at least every 5 years. Some countries operate 
with more frequent revaluations, even every year. But in a periodic system, missing a 
revaluation tends to make it difficult to get back on track because the gains and, more 
especially, the losses, tend to be larger(Heady, 2009). Thus a robust revaluation 
schedule is an important element for a properly functioning property tax. 
3.3 Tax rate 
Tax rates on property in the US, where property taxes are local taxes, tend to be in the 
range of 1% to 3% (Smith, 2009). Of course, this is in a context where income taxes 
are a good deal lower than in most European countries. Here we focus on a much 
lower tax rate, geared so as to bring in a revenue of around €1,000m per annum. 
3.4 Relationship to ability to pay 
How should property tax be related to ability to pay? There are a number of 
possibilities. Low income individuals may be exempt from the tax, or have their 
property tax bill reduced. Alternatively, the tax bills of low income individuals, 
particularly the elderly, may be deferred, and rolled up against the eventual sale of the 
property. While there are merits to the deferral system, it is much less common, and in 
introducing a property tax it may be best to focus on how an income related rebate or 
waiver could be designed. 
 
One key question here is whose income is to be measured. There will be households 
in which the owner has relatively low income, but there are also adult children present 
with higher incomes, so that there are sufficient resources in the household to pay the 
bill. In our analysis we focus on an income waiver which is related to the income of 
the owner and his or her spouse, but does not include the incomes of other household 
members. Potentially, a scheme which looked at wider household incomes could raise 
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more net revenue and/or afford greater protection to households with least resources. 
This is an area that could be studied in further research. 
 
A further issue arises in the administration of an income related scheme. Ideally, for 
administrative efficiency, income or resources would be measured once, for example 
by the tax system, and this income measure would be used for several purposes e.g., 
the calculation of income tax, and the calculation of income-related relief from 
property tax. The report of the de Buitleir committee, however, confirmed the 
widespread belief that the operation of the student grant system tended to favour those 
students whose parents were self-employed or farmers. This was because grants were 
determined on the basis of a single year of income, and the self-employed including 
farmers were better placed to ensure that their incomes fell below critical cut-offs for 
entitlement to grants. 
 
A similar scenario may be of relevance when it comes to property tax reliefs. If 
taxable income is not a good measure of long-term resources for those who are self-
employed, then there may be a case for having income-related relief administered in a 
different way, which is better able to take account of these long-term resources. Thus, 
there might be a Property Tax Benefit (like the UK’s Council Tax Benefit) for which 
individuals would have to apply under the social welfare code. 
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4. Data and Modelling Framework 
In this section we outline the tools used for this analysis of property tax options. The 
starting point is SWITCH, the ESRI tax-benefit model, which analyses the social 
welfare entitlements and income tax liabilities of a nationally representative sample of 
households. The database for SWITCH comes from the CSO’s Survey of Income and 
Living Conditions (EU SILC), which also contains direct data on owners’ estimates of  
residential property values, and further data on housing characteristics. For this paper, 
these data on housing values were added to the SWITCH database, so that the model 
could be extended to simulate the impact of introducing a property tax.  
4.1 SWITCH, the ESRI tax-benefit model  
When considering the potential impact of tax changes, calculations are often 
undertaken for just a small number of illustrative families. This approach has severe 
limitations. For example, less than one family in 20 falls into the category of “one-
earner couple with 2 children” which attracts so much attention at budget time. 
Furthermore families within this category differ in terms of income, housing tenure, 
and other characteristics that affect their tax-benefit position. More fundamentally, 
analysis of hypothetical families - no matter how well chosen - simply cannot give an 
overall picture of the impact of a policy change on incomes and work incentives.  For 
this reason, in many countries policy changes are assessed using tax-benefit models 
which are based on large-scale nationally representative samples of households. This 
ensures that the models represent as fully as possible the great diversity of household 
circumstances relevant to tax and social welfare. Several countries including the UK 
and the US have models which are maintained and used by official departments or 
agencies, as well as models developed and used in the academic sector (e.g., the 
Institute for Fiscal Studies, the Tax Policy Center in Washington and the 
Microsimulation Unit at the University of Essex).  In Ireland, the ESRI has developed 
a microsimulation model of the Irish tax and benefit systems, SWITCH (Simulating 
Welfare and Income Tax CHanges). 
 
The current SWITCH database uses data from the EU’s Survey on Income and Living 
Conditions (EU SILC) for the year 2005. The survey contains detailed information on 
more than 6,000 households including about 15,000 individuals. These data include 
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detailed information on household size and composition, labour market participation, 
incomes from work and occupational pensions, and from receipts of social welfare 
payments.. The SWITCH database is adjusted from year to year to allow for key 
changes in incomes and population structure as forecast for the next budgetary year. 
Changes in social welfare rates, income tax rates, bands and allowances, and the 
structure of employee PRSI are taken into account within the model. Using these data 
the model has been developed to simulate the rules of the welfare and tax systems so 
as to allow it to predict the tax liabilities and welfare entitlements of respondents 
under the existing tax/welfare rules and under alternative reforms. 
The capabilities of the model include: 
• Estimation of the net budgetary cost of packages of tax and welfare changes. 
Alternative reform packages with the same budgetary cost can therefore be 
constructed. 
• Estimation of the pattern of gains and losses from a policy change. The 
numbers of families gaining and losing and the size of their gains and losses 
can be estimated, and the distribution of gains and losses across family types 
and income levels can be explored. 
• Estimation of the impact of policy changes on effective marginal tax rates.  
 
The model has now been extended to allow for the modelling of various property tax 
options. This required the use of data contained in the survey on house values, 
described in the next section, and the establishment of a set of rules for modelling 
property tax liability, described in Section 4.4. 
4.2 Data Issues 
EU SILC contains information on the value of the house as assessed by the owner. In 
addition, respondents are asked for the insured value of the house and the insured 
value of house and contents combined. In the EU SILC sample there are nearly 5,000 
households who own their home. Of these nearly 70 per cent own the house outright 
while the remaining 30 percent have an outstanding mortgage. About 4,500 of the 
5,000 home-owners provide an estimated house value. For the remaining 500 we must 
therefore estimate a house value  based on the information available in the dataset.  
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Our strategy in arriving at an alternative house value estimate is as follows. First, we 
examine information on the insured value of the house (or house and contents if the 
insured house value is not provided). Households may sometimes be unsure of the 
market value of their home but are likely to know the value they have insured their 
property for with more certainty.  The insured value is therefore useful in cases where 
the actual house value is not provided or appears incorrect. Typically, however, the 
insured value is somewhat lower than the actual market value of the home. In order to 
take account of this, we applied a “correction factor” derived as follows. For those 
who provided both a house value estimate and the insured value, we calculated the 
average ratio of the estimated house value to the insured house value. We then applied 
this ratio to the insured house value, where this was the only information available.  
 
Cases existed in the dataset that were missing both the house value and the two 
insured values. In these cases information on many characteristics relevant to house 
value were still available. We estimated the relationship between house values and 
these characteristics for households where full information was available. (This 
hedonic regression approach has been described and applied by Conniffe and 
Duffy(1999)The characteristics used included: 
• location 
• number of rooms 
• house type (detached, semi-detached etc) 
• neighbourhood traits (for example whether or not crime was a problem, 
pollution etc.)  
Then we used this relationship to predict house value for cases where only the 
characteristics, and not the value, were known. This technique is known in the 
literature as hedonic regression. As a final check, we also examined outliers in the 
dataset focussing on very low and very high house values. This revealed a small 
number of inconsistencies which were  resolved on a case-by-case basis. 
 
Statistics from the Department of the Environment indicate a stock of dwellings of 
1.7m at the end of 2005. The standardised average house price at that time (from the 
Permanent TSB-ESRI series) was close to €288,000. Given an owner-occupancy rate 
of about 77 per cent, this suggests that the total value of the owner-occupied housing 
stock was in the region of €3,700m. Our estimates, based on the data in the CSO’s 
-13- 
Survey on Income and Living Conditions, suggest a figure in the region of €3,500m. 
This suggests that the SILC data provide a reasonable approximation of the overall 
tax base, but with the great advantage of considerable detail on the incomes, 
composition and other characteristics of households. Our work builds on this to 
examine the implications of alternative forms of property tax for this nationally 
representative sample of households. 
 
Since 2005 house prices first rose to a peak in late 2006 or early 2007, and then fell 
sharply, by between 20 and 30 per cent according the latest estimates (Duffy, 2009). 
While there is some divergence between alternative estimates of house price trends, it 
is clear that a major downward adjustment is required in order to assess the potential 
role for property tax under new housing market conditions. We have taken a very 
conservative approach, aimed at providing not just for falls to date in the price of 
housing  but some potential further falls. We do so in order to examine how property 
tax might look in a long term context, rather than simply in the current or next 
budgetary year. The “discount factor” applied to house prices in the calculations in the 
present paper implies a fall of one-third in house prices from their 2005 level (and 
therefore somewhat greater relative to peak values in early 2007). This is by no means 
a forecast, but it is an attempt to arrive at a somewhat conservative estimate of the 
potential revenue from a property tax. The introduction of property tax might itself 
lead to some further downward pressure on house prices, though evidence on such 
capitalization effects is mixed. 
4.3  Modelling property taxes and income-related rebates 
In our modelling work we have allowed for a number of options with respect to the 
structure of a property tax, and with respect to income-related rebates or waivers. 
While our empirical work to date concentrates on a subset of these possibilities, it is 
important to document the options currently available in the context of possible future 
work for the Commission. 
We allow for a property tax to be calculated  
• as a simple percentage of the estimated value of the residential property 
• as a specific amount for properties with values lying within up to 10 specified 
bands 
 
-14- 
In the present paper, we focus on the former option, applying a specified percentage 
to an exact or “discrete” property value. This is the most common approach, and 
appears to have most to recommend it. However, it may be that such a system is not 
attainable in the short-term, while a banded system could be implemented more 
quickly. The SWITCH model is able to simulate the banded system, so that its impact 
can be examined and compared not only with the status quo (no property tax) but also 
with a full system based on discrete property values. 
 
Turning to income-related exemptions, waivers and rebates, we allow for a number of 
key parameters to be varied. The first of these is an income exemption limit for 
property tax.  This is an income-cut off, below which no property tax would be 
payable. We allow for this to be a simple cut-off in terms of disposable income 
(income after taxes, PRSI, levies and including social welfare benefits). While some 
benefits and taxes operate in terms of gross income, disposable income seems a more 
appropriate criterion here – as with the Family Income Supplement in Ireland, or 
Housing Benefit in the UK, the aim is to ensure that income after expenses does not 
fall below a certain floor.  
 
The UK’s Council Tax Benefit is based around the idea of paying a full rebate for 
those individuals or families whose incomes fall below a “needs amount” which 
varies depending on the characteristics of the family. Factors taken into account 
include the number and ages of children, but also the category of welfare recipient 
(e.g., old age, persons with a disability, lone parent). This creates quite an elaborate 
menu of income support, differentiated by category of recipient. In our initial work 
we have taken a simpler approach. We adjust incomes to take account of family size 
and composition, using an adult equivalence scale which approximates that used in 
the Irish welfare system. Thus, the income-cut off used in our analysis is based around 
income adjusted for family size and composition, or equivalised income as it is often 
termed. It is equivalised income which is also used by the EU to identify those “at risk 
of poverty”. 
 
If full relief is provided for (equivalised) incomes below the specified cut-off, and no 
benefit for those with incomes above the cut-off, then benefit withdrawal would take 
place in an “all or nothing” fashion. This would create a sharp “poverty trap”, where a 
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small increase in earnings or other income would give rise to a substantial fall in 
disposable income. Most systems would allow for a gradual reduction in benefit (or 
property tax rebate). We allow for a property tax marginal relief rate, which could 
also be termed a rebate/benefit withdrawal rate. 
 
The higher the income exemption limit, and the lower the rebate withdrawal 
rate/marginal relief rate, the more extensive is the protection afforded to those on low 
incomes. Increasing the exemption limit, and/or lowering the property tax marginal 
relief rate means that individuals and families who are further up the income scale 
obtain at least some benefit from the income-related reductions in property tax. The 
trade-off facing the government is that this also reduces the net revenue from the 
property tax. Results in the next section will give some initial exploration of this 
issue. We set the property tax marginal relief rate at 20 per cent (the value used in the 
UK’s Council Tax Benefit) and explore the impact of income exemption limits at 
€12,000 per annum and €15,000 per annum. 
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5. Impact of a property tax 
We begin our exploration of the potential for a property tax with a very simple 
scheme: property tax is calculated as a given percentage of the value of each owner-
occupied property. We examine how much revenue this would raise, and its impact at 
low, medium and high income levels. We then examine how the revenue and 
distributional impacts are altered by the addition of provisions for a waiver of 
property tax – either full or partial – for those on low incomes. The geographic 
distribution of property tax liabilities is then outlined, in light of earlier experience 
with the Residential Property Tax which was heavily concentrated on the Dublin area. 
Finally, we consider the implications of the income-related reliefs for the financial 
incentive to work. The main findings are drawn together in the concluding section. 
5.1 Simple Property Tax: Revenue and Distributional Impact 
We examine the impact of a simple proportionate tax on all owner-occupied 
residential property as a starting point. At this stage, we make no provision for reliefs 
linked to low income, so that we can examine the potential liability across the full 
distribution of income. We find that a tax rate of 0.4 per cent of the value of the 
property would raise €1,100m per annum. The average amount of tax for those 
affected would be about €950 per annum. For comparisons with monthly salaries and 
mortgage payments, we may note that this equates to about €80 per month; in weekly 
terms the average tax payment would be just over €18. These averages are based on 
the mean value of the house and the tax. A substantial majority of those paying the tax 
would pay less than this. 
 
Where does this tax take come from in terms of the distribution of income? Table 2 
divides the population into deciles – tenths of the population with successively higher 
incomes, from the lowest to the highest. The income criterion used is income adjusted 
for needs, as measured by family size and composition. The equivalence scale used 
allows for the fact that there are economies of scale for adults living together, and that 
the needs of children are somewhat lower than those of adults. The precise scale 
allows 1 unit for the first adult in the family, 0.66 for a second adult and 0.33 for 
children. This is the “national scale” used in CSO analyses of poverty risks (e.g., 
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CSO, 2008).2 In the present analyses, we focus on the narrow family unit or so called 
“tax unit” – an individual or couple, together with dependant children. 
 
Table 2: Distributional impact of a simple property tax (0.4% of capital value of owner-
occupied property) 
 
Decile 
Adjusted Net 
Income 
% of 
households 
% Change 
in Income 
for Income 
Group 
Average 
loss for 
those 
affected  
 
More 
than 
Less 
Than   € p w 
Lowest  204 10 -1.0 13.50 
2 204 263 10 -1.4 11.70 
3 263 325 10 -1.9 13.86 
4 325 396 10 -1.2 16.75 
5 396 449 10 -1.0 15.56 
6 449 519 10 -1.3 15.61 
7 519 605 10 -1.3 19.54 
8 605 711 10 -1.6 21.58 
9 711 889 10 -1.2 20.44 
Highest 889  10 -1.1 25.66 
Total     100 -1.3 18.31 
 
The average impact of the tax represents a fall of 1.3 per cent in disposable income. 
The loss is somewhat less at the top of the income distribution (1.1 or 1.2 per cent). 
The greatest proportionate loss is in the third decile, where the loss is 1.9 per cent of 
disposable income. A significant proportion of those on the lowest incomes are in the 
rented sector (either in local authority or private tenancies) and this attenuates the 
impact of a tax on owner occupied residential property on those on the lowest 
incomes. The final column takes account of this by focusing on the average loss per 
week for those who are affected (owner occupiers). Losses range from about €12 to 
€14 per week for those on the lowest incomes, €16 to €20 for the middle income 
deciles, and €20 to €25 for those on higher incomes. The extent and size of the losses 
in the bottom 3 deciles point to the importance of arriving at a system which takes 
account of ability to pay, for those with housing assets but low incomes. We take up 
this issue in the next section.  
                                                 
2 Income per adult equivalent is often referred to as equivalised income. 
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5.2 Property Tax with an  Income Exemption Limit and Marginal Relief 
In order to take account of ability to pay, we examine a property tax which provides 
for a full rebate to those below a specified income limit, and a partial rebate for those 
somewhat above that limit. The broad structure has been outlined above. We look first 
at an income limit which is set at the level of the State Contributory Pension, 
approximately €230 per week or €12,000 per annum. The rebate is withdrawn at the 
rate of 20 cent in the euro on income above the limit – thus the “rebate withdrawal 
rate” or “marginal relief rate” is 20 per cent. 
 
Table 3 summarises the broad impact of this scheme. Losses for those in the bottom 
decile (the lowest 10 per cent of incomes) are eliminated, and losses in the second and 
third deciles are substantially reduced. The average bill for those affected is close to 
€6 per week in the second decile and under €9 per week in the third decile, compared 
with figures of €12 and €14 per week under a simple property tax.  
 
Table 3: Distributional impact of a property tax with an income exemption limit and 
marginal relief 
 
Decile 
Adjusted Net 
Income 
% of 
households 
% Change 
in Income 
Average 
loss for 
those 
affected 
 
More 
than 
Less 
Than   € p w 
Lowest  204 10 0 0 
2 204 263 10 -0.3 5.73 
3 263 325 10 -1.0 8.68 
4 325 396 10 -1.1 15.59 
5 396 449 10 -1.0 15.42 
6 449 519 10 -1.2 15.31 
7 519 605 10 -1.2 19.30 
8 605 711 10 -1.5 20.49 
9 711 889 10 -1.2 20.44 
Highest 889  10 -1.1 25.66 
Total     100 -1.1 17.71 
Note: Tax rate is 0.4% of property value; income exemption limit is €12,000 per annum; and 
marginal relief rate is 20%. 
 
Under the same structure, an increase in the income exemption limit to €15,000 per 
annum – about one quarter higher than the highest social welfare payment would 
virtually eliminate losses in the second decile, and substantially reduce the number of 
losses in the third decile. 
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Table 4: Distributional impact of a property tax with an income exemption limit and 
marginal relief 
 
Decile 
Adjusted Net 
Income 
% of 
households 
% Change 
in Income 
Average 
loss for 
those 
affected 
 
More 
than 
Less 
Than   € p w 
Lowest  204 10 0 0 
2 204 263 10 0 7.56 
3 263 325 10 -0.2 6.27 
4 325 396 10 -1.0 14.16 
5 396 449 10 -1.0 15.24 
6 449 519 10 -1.2 15.17 
7 519 605 10 -1.2 19.26 
8 605 711 10 -1.5 20.43 
9 711 889 10 -1.2 20.44 
Highest 889  10 -1.1 25.66 
Total     100 -1.0 18.78 
Note: Tax rate is 0.4% of property value; income exemption limit is €12,000 per annum; and 
marginal relief rate is 20%. 
 
How is overall revenue affected by such income-related reductions to property tax 
liability? Table 5 shows that while revenue is reduced, these schemes retain between 
80 and 90 per cent of the revenue of a simple property tax. Thus it is possible to have 
a property tax structure which raises substantial revenue, while providing protection 
for those on low incomes. 
 
Table 5: Revenue impact of alternative waivers and rebates for property tax 
 
Income exemption limit 
(disposable income per 
annum) 
Rebate withdrawal rate 
(%) 
Revenue 
€m per annum 
Simple property tax 0 n.a. 1,101 
Property tax with 
income exemption limit 
and marginal relief €12,000 20% 973 
Property tax with 
income exemption limit 
and marginal relief €15,000 20% 906 
    
Note: A tax rate of 0.4% is applied in all cases   
 
Regional distribution 
What about the regional distribution of revenue from property tax? A combination of 
factors led to the former Residential Property Tax raising close to three quarters of its 
revenue from the Dublin area. How would a property tax of the type examined here 
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compare? Table 6 shows how the share of revenue raised under a property tax (with a 
rate of 0.4 per cent and an income cut off of €12,000) varies across regions, and, for 
comparison, the shares of the regions in population and in income. 
 
Table 6: Regional shares of Population, Income and Property Tax 
Region Households 
Disposable 
income 
Property Tax 
Revenue 
Border 9 7 6 
Midland 5 4 3 
West 8 6 6 
Dublin 36 44 52 
Mid-East 9 9 10 
Mid-West 7 7 5 
South-East 10 7 6 
South-West 16 14 12 
Total 100 100 100 
 
Dublin accounts for a higher share of the yield from property tax than its share in the 
population of households. However, Dublin also has a higher share of disposable 
income, indicating a higher than average income. Given the progressivity of the 
income tax code, the share of Dublin in the gross income would be higher than 44 per 
cent, and its share in the revenue from income tax would be higher again. Thus, while 
Dublin’s share in the property tax is above its share in the population, it is not so far 
above its share in income or income tax – and a long way below the share it 
contributed in the narrower Residential Property tax. 
5.3 Impact on financial incentives to work 
If, because of a low income waiver, property tax is not payable at a low income, and 
is payable in full at a higher income, then there is an implicit tax rate on income in 
moving from the lower to the higher level. This is most clear-cut in the case of those 
who are in the “marginal relief” zone, where the amount of a property tax rebate is 
reduced by a given percentage for each extra euro of income. But those with incomes 
below the exemption limit would also face an extra effective tax rate on  earnings 
(over and above any income tax or PRSI liabilities) in moving from an income below 
that limit to one in the marginal relief zone or to an income at which full property tax 
would be paid. 
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Some examples may help to clarify the nature of the impact on financial incentives to 
work. First, consider the position of a low income individual benefiting from a partial 
waiver of property tax. He or she will face the usual deductions from any additional 
earnings – income tax, PRSI and levies – but will, in addition, find his or her 
disposable income reduced by a further 20 cent in the euro of disposable income. 
Thus, if facing the standard rate of tax of 20 per cent and PRSI/levies of 8 per cent, 
extra earnings of €100 would translate into an increase in disposable income of €72 
for someone not receiving a property tax rebate. But for someone in receipt of a 
rebate, there would be a further reduction of €14.40 (20 per cent of €72). This would 
leave the net gain at €57.60. So the effective tax rate on additional earnings would rise 
from 28 per cent to 42 per cent for an individual in receipt of the property tax rebate. 
Individuals in receipt of a full rebate would also see their work incentives affected if 
the increased income would mean that their property tax rebate would be reduced or 
eliminated. 
 
Impacts on the financial incentive to work would not, however, be limited to those 
actually in receipt of marginal relief/partial rebates. The balance between income in 
employment and income out of employment would also be affected. For example,  a 
person moving from very low income, with a full rebate of property tax, to a job at 
low earnings could find that the full property tax bill would become payable. This 
aspect of the financial incentive to work is commonly measured by replacement rates, 
which estimate what proportion of disposable income when in work is retained or 
“replaced”, when out of work. 
 
Estimates from the SWITCH model suggest that an income exemption limit of 
€12,000 per annum – corresponding roughly to the old age contributory pension rate 
of €230 per week - would mean that full rebates would apply to approximately 
125,000 households. Provision for “marginal relief” or a sliding scale of rebates, with 
the rebate being reduced by 20 cent for every euro of disposable income, would lead 
to partial rebates for a further 100,000 households. If the property tax income 
exemption limit were set instead at €15,000 per annum, then full relief from property 
tax would be afforded on income grounds to approximately 235,000 households. A 
further 45,000 households would receive partial relief from property tax, if the 
withdrawal rate or marginal relief rate were set at 20 per cent. 
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How does this scale of relief compare with the waivers in place in Northern Ireland? 
A precise comparison is not possible, because the Northern Ireland property tax 
applies to all residential property, owner occupied and rented. For reasons explained 
earlier (principally related to the unavailability of data on the capital values of rental 
accommodation in the Survey on Income and Living Conditions), here we analyse a 
property tax which applies only to the owner-occupied sector. In Northern Ireland, 
about 20 per cent of the population have their property tax bill paid under the housing 
benefit scheme. A further significant proportion receives rebates under the low 
income relief scheme. Under the schemes examined here, an income limit of €12,000 
per annum would imply that about 8 per cent of owner-occupiers would obtain full 
relief from property tax. A higher limit of €15,000 would imply that almost double 
this proportion would benefit from full relief – 15 per cent of owner occupiers would 
have a zero liability. A very substantial proportion of those in local authority 
tenancies would also be likely to qualify for income-related relief, if, as in Northern 
Ireland, the tax were applicable to the rental sector. This suggests that the parameters 
used to explore income related reliefs are operating on a broadly similar proportion of 
the population as in Northern Ireland. A more precise comparison would be of 
interest, and is one of the areas for further research. 
 
In our view, one of the key areas for further research is to explore the impact of 
alternative structures of property tax waiver and marginal relief on financial 
incentives to work. By this we mean not only the impact on marginal effective tax 
rates, but also the impact on replacement rates which are of greater relevance to the 
most important labour supply decisions, those affecting participation and the intensity 
of job search. More can be done in this area using the SWITCH model, which has the 
capacity to analyse such issues; but time did not permit the inclusion of such analyses 
in the current draft.  
6. Summary and conclusions 
Key findings from our analysis of a property tax for Ireland include the following: 
• A property tax at a rate of 0.4 per cent of property value can raise substantial 
revenue, of the order of €1 billion per annum 
• An income exemption limit and marginal relief can ensure that there are few 
losses, if any, among those on the lowest incomes (the lowest 20 to 30 per cent 
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of the income distribution) and that such losses as remain are much more 
limited than under a simple property tax. 
• While the provision of income-related reliefs involves some loss of revenue, 
about 80 to 90 per cent of the revenue which would be generated by a simple 
property tax could still be retained.  
• There are significant implications for financial incentives to work which 
require further study. 
There is potentially an important role for a property tax in a country such as Ireland, 
where the tax system is particularly favourable to owner occupation. A property tax 
could raise substantial revenue, and income-related reliefs could ensure that losses 
among those with the lowest incomes were small in scale.  
 
As discussed in Section 2, the introduction of a recurrent tax on property could be part 
of a package involving the reduction or elimination of the stamp duty tax on house 
purchases. While such a shift would have the attraction of reducing barriers to 
mobility, by reducing on eliminating a transactions tax, there would also be 
significant transitional issues to be dealt with. For example, an individual who had 
purchase a house in the last year or two would have paid substantial taxes under the 
“old” transactions-based system, and now face substantial ongoing taxes under the 
“new” system of recurrent tax on property. How might this transitional issue be dealt 
with? 
 
One possibility would be to provide some form of credit in relation to stamp duty paid 
on houses purchased in the recent past. This would provide some relief for those who 
had purchased, and paid stamp duty, at the top of the boom, with the full property tax 
levied on those who purchased at an early stage, who have benefited most from the 
rise in capital values. For example, houses purchased more than 10 years ago might be 
subject to the full property tax. For houses purchased in the past 10 years,  a credit 
might be calculated depending on the amount of stamp duty paid e.g., 10 per cent of 
the stamp duty would count as a credit against property tax for the 10 years after 
purchase. These figures and structure are purely illustrative – they serve to show how 
a scheme that deals with the issue of transitions could be developed, but there are of 
course many other ways in which this could be done. It is not essential that fixed 
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period like 10 years be chosen – other formulae might take account of the amount of 
stamp duty actually paid and the time lag since purchase in different ways. 
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